Tuesday, August 21, 2007

What Science Does That Religion Doesn't

I recently read an article on new research findings regarding homo habilis and homo erectus that had supposedly negative implications regarding evolutionary theory—at least that's the way the story was presented in the media. Fearing, I presume, that research she was a party to might be latched onto by creationist-types, one of the researchers, Susan Anton (not that Susan Anton), launched a preemptive strike,

"This is a great example of what science does and religion doesn't do. It's a continous self-testing process."

This post is not in the least about the scientific findings or its implications. What I want to know is what does she mean when she says self-testing is something science does but religion doesn't (if that's what she's saying). It seems so broad a statement as to be practically meaningless. Am I missing something? I've heard the same line used almost verbatim recently in a blog conversation (before this article appeared) so I'm wondering if it's a currently fashionable anti-religion blurb. In any case I'm hoping someone can shed some light on what this put-down of religion is supposedly putting down.

In case you're interested, here's an instance of the article: Fossils Challenge Old Evolution Theory

08/28 Edit: I have updated the link. Hopefully this one will be functional for a while.

Math is a Religion

Monday, August 6, 2007

The Argument Against Naturalism v1.1

Is it likely, given naturalistic evolution, that our cognitive faculties (minds, brains, or whatever else might be involved) are reliable in that they produce true beliefs? In order to present the argument properly, or at least as best I can, I will broadly define the main ideas in question.

First, evolutionary theory maintains that all forms of life , including we humans, have developed from simple single-celled organisms by the processes of natural selection, genetic drift working on genetic variation, and, most popularly, random genetic mutation. Second, naturalism states that there are no supernatural beings, there is no God to direct the evolutionary process in any way.

So what is the probability (P) that our cognitive faculties are reliable (R) given the conjunction of naturalism (N) and evolutionary theory (E)? Stated as an equation it's P(R/N&E).

In the previous post I mentioned that Darwin himself had doubts that this probability was very high. It may be more accurate to say he was worried the probability was very low.

Why would Darwin harbor such doubt? Patricia Churchland explains:

“Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.” (Churchland's emphasis)


In the previous post cyberkitten objected, saying that we can test our cognitive faculties (CF) to determine if are indeed producing true beliefs. My reply was that relying on the deliverances of our CF in order to verify our CF is pragmatically circular. Either way it's beside the point. If Timmy wants to prove that Santa Claus brought him an X-Box for Christmas, by verifying that it indeed is in his room he hasn't shown us anything relevant to our question: did Santa bring it?

This conversation is not about our CF per se, but rather, if what we know about naturalistic evolution is accurate, does that knowledge give us any reason to trust our CF as the output of that process?

Simply put, is P(R/N&E) high, low, or inscrutable?

Wednesday, August 1, 2007

An Argument Against Naturalism

Richard Dawkins: "Although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist."

Charles Darwin: "With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"

Karl Popper: "Since we have evolved and survived, we may be pretty sure that our hypotheses and guesses as to what the world is like are mostly correct."

W.V.O. Quine: "Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind."

Patricia Churchland: "The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive...Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."

So who is right?

Darwin and Churchland propose that the probability of human cognitive faculties' being reliable, given that they've have been produced by evolution is low. The ultimate purpose or function of our cognitive faculties, if indeed they have a purpose or function, will be survival—of individual, species, gene, or genotype. But then it is unlikely that they have the production of true beliefs as a function. So the probability or our faculties' being reliable, given naturalistic evolution, would be fairly low.

Popper and Quine, on the other side, judge that probability fairly high.

What do you think? I was planning on going through Alvin Plantinga's entire argument against naturalism, but, since I hate to read long posts I guess probably shouldn't write one. It might even be better to let the argument unfold, err...., naturally.