Socrates and Euthyphro meet outside the food court. As they wait in line for gyros they strike up the following conversation.
Socrates: Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral?
Euthyphro: This is certainly the case.
S: And we are obligated to obey God because He truly relates to us the moral law?
E: You have put your finger precisely on it.
S: If God merely intermediates between man and the moral law, could we not discern the law for ourselves, bypassing, as it were, the middle man?
E: Heaven forbid! These things are too lofty for us!
S: Too lofty for us to receive directly, but not too lofty when passed from hand-to-hand? If God truly relates these things to us surely they are not tarnished in transmission.
E: I would hope not. [PE contemplates] Perhaps God is required to comprehend the source. If we were to approach it directly we would not perceive it rightly, or we would be consumed by its holiness.
S: You may have something there, but two things worry me if this state of affairs obtain.
E: And they are...?
S: First, is it conceivable that what we call God is subject to a superior holiness? Second, does this holiness approve of our offering worship to its messenger rather than itself?
E: This cannot be! God, by definition, is the Supreme Being and what is supreme serves no master.
S: But we have arrived here by mutual agreement, and we have found that God is not God.
[Standing just behind them is William who has overheard the conversation. He interjects...]
William: Excuse me. May I add a thought of my own at this point?
E & S: Please do.
W: What is this superior holiness that God intermediates for us, to which He is beholden?
S: The Good.
W: What is it's nature?
S: As far as I can tell it is an eternal and universal set of moral relations.
W: Is it a thing or an abstraction?
S: An abstraction, a principle.
W: And this abstract set moral relations bind us as well as God?
S: I would think so.
W: It follows then that all things are obliged to adhere to this eternal and universal set of moral relations. Is that your understanding?
S: It is.
W: Do you see this ant crawling up the table leg?
S: I see it.
W: If all things are obliged, is this ant obliged?
S: I don't know much about ants, but I doubt if ants are under any obligation.
W: How about the table itself?
S: Certainly not.
W: So not all things are bound by this superior holiness?
S: No, not all things, but all sentient beings.
W: A helpful clarification, but it raises a question. If there were no sentient beings, if the world were populated only by ants, would there be anything under obligation?
S: I suppose not.
W: And if there were no sentient beings, a set of moral relations would be meaningless, perhaps impossible?
S: I'd have to think that through, but is sounds plausible.
W: Likewise, would not Good itself would be meaningless or impossible?
S: [exhibiting consternation] Mmmmm...
W: Can we conclude that an abstract set of moral relations cannot exist in a vacuum; that at least one sentient being is required for goodness and obligation to have any meaning whatsoever? Can we further conclude that these abstractions cannot precede a being, but must emanate from a being that sets them and imposes obligation upon all beings including himself? Can we ultimately conclude that such a being cannot be distinct from Good but is the source of Good, or, simply stated, is Good Itself. You ask, "Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral?" But now surely you see that what is moral can only be what God commands.
S: [continued consternation] You have given me food for thought.
E: Thank you William, but I must tell you that I was just about to make this same point myself.
W: Sorry for stepping on your toes Euthyphro. [The conversation hits a lull, the three men are looking around. Williams continues after a sigh.] Is the service here always so exceedingly slow?
S: Euthyphro, coming here was your idea. What gives?
E: Hey, I've always used the drive-thru!
