What Science Does That Religion Doesn't

I recently read an article on new research findings regarding homo habilis and homo erectus that had supposedly negative implications regarding evolutionary theory—at least that's the way the story was presented in the media. Fearing, I presume, that research she was a party to might be latched onto by creationist-types, one of the researchers, Susan Anton (not that Susan Anton), launched a preemptive strike,

"This is a great example of what science does and religion doesn't do. It's a continous self-testing process."

This post is not in the least about the scientific findings or its implications. What I want to know is what does she mean when she says self-testing is something science does but religion doesn't (if that's what she's saying). It seems so broad a statement as to be practically meaningless. Am I missing something? I've heard the same line used almost verbatim recently in a blog conversation (before this article appeared) so I'm wondering if it's a currently fashionable anti-religion blurb. In any case I'm hoping someone can shed some light on what this put-down of religion is supposedly putting down.

In case you're interested, here's an instance of the article: Fossils Challenge Old Evolution Theory

08/28 Edit: I have updated the link. Hopefully this one will be functional for a while.

Math is a Religion

The Argument Against Naturalism v1.1

Is it likely, given naturalistic evolution, that our cognitive faculties (minds, brains, or whatever else might be involved) are reliable in that they produce true beliefs? In order to present the argument properly, or at least as best I can, I will broadly define the main ideas in question.

First, evolutionary theory maintains that all forms of life , including we humans, have developed from simple single-celled organisms by the processes of natural selection, genetic drift working on genetic variation, and, most popularly, random genetic mutation. Second, naturalism states that there are no supernatural beings, there is no God to direct the evolutionary process in any way.

So what is the probability (P) that our cognitive faculties are reliable (R) given the conjunction of naturalism (N) and evolutionary theory (E)? Stated as an equation it's P(R/N&E).

In the previous post I mentioned that Darwin himself had doubts that this probability was very high. It may be more accurate to say he was worried the probability was very low.

Why would Darwin harbor such doubt? Patricia Churchland explains:

“Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.” (Churchland's emphasis)

In the previous post cyberkitten objected, saying that we can test our cognitive faculties (CF) to determine if are indeed producing true beliefs. My reply was that relying on the deliverances of our CF in order to verify our CF is pragmatically circular. Either way it's beside the point. If Timmy wants to prove that Santa Claus brought him an X-Box for Christmas, by verifying that it indeed is in his room he hasn't shown us anything relevant to our question: did Santa bring it?

This conversation is not about our CF per se, but rather, if what we know about naturalistic evolution is accurate, does that knowledge give us any reason to trust our CF as the output of that process?

Simply put, is P(R/N&E) high, low, or inscrutable?

An Argument Against Naturalism

Richard Dawkins: "Although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist."

Charles Darwin: "With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"

Karl Popper: "Since we have evolved and survived, we may be pretty sure that our hypotheses and guesses as to what the world is like are mostly correct."

W.V.O. Quine: "Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind."

Patricia Churchland: "The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive...Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."

So who is right?

Darwin and Churchland propose that the probability of human cognitive faculties' being reliable, given that they've have been produced by evolution is low. The ultimate purpose or function of our cognitive faculties, if indeed they have a purpose or function, will be survival—of individual, species, gene, or genotype. But then it is unlikely that they have the production of true beliefs as a function. So the probability or our faculties' being reliable, given naturalistic evolution, would be fairly low.

Popper and Quine, on the other side, judge that probability fairly high.

What do you think? I was planning on going through Alvin Plantinga's entire argument against naturalism, but, since I hate to read long posts I guess probably shouldn't write one. It might even be better to let the argument unfold, err...., naturally.

In Nebo-Sarsekim We Trust

Over at Scriptorium Daily Greg Peters has restrained his enthusiasm over a recent story in the London Times entitled, “Museum’s tablet lends new weight to Biblical truth.”

Atheist-ish

Recently I've had conversations with people who label themselves atheists while insisting that means they "do not believe God exists" but not, heaven forbid, that they "believe God does not exist". They say the two are very different claims. Honestly, in those conversations I may have muddied the waters in attempting to make a case that the two statements are indistinguishable for all practical purposes. In my defense, I have always understood how they differ. Of course they are not logically identical. Stating "I believe there is no [whatever]" is a positive claim to knowledge, while stating "I don't believe there is a [whatever]" is a negative claim to knowledge. My assertion remains that a proper atheist is one who makes the positive claim. And I'm not alone. Anthony Flew (when he was still an atheist) wrote,

"the word 'atheist' has, in the present context, to be construed in an unusual way. Nowadays it is normally taken to mean someone who explicitly denies the existence...of God.... But here it has to be understood not positively but negatively, with the originally Greek prefix ‘a-’ being read [the] same way in ‘atheist’ as it customarily is in...words as ‘amoral’.... In this interpretation an atheist becomes not someone who positively asserts the non-existence of God, but someone who is simply not a theist.

—The Presumption of Atheism (emphasis mine)

If this "unusual way" of defining the word 'atheist' is accepted—despite the fact that such a definition is otherwise engaged—we need:

1) a new term for a person with sufficient philosophical fortitude to make the positive claim, and
2) a new definition for the word 'agnostic'.

After we come to agreement on terms, we can then address why those atheists who have retreated to the meeker agnostic position still want to retain the bolder label? I think William Lane Craig has the answer:

"If atheism is taken to be a view, namely the view that there is no God, then atheists must shoulder their share of the burden of proof to support this view. But many atheists admit freely that they cannot sustain such a burden of proof. So they try to shirk their epistemic responsibility by re-defining atheism so that it is no longer a view but just a psychological condition which as such makes no assertions. They are really closet agnostics who want to claim the mantle of atheism without shouldering its responsibilities."

So is there a God or not? Theists answer yes. Atheists answer no. Those who defer are agnostic. Which are you? Why say one thing when you mean another?

Mastec Motors: Scenario A: The Walker

Part 2 of a response to Kevin Parry's A Difference of Paradigms
(Read Part 1)

A customer walks into a Mastec Motors showroom and is approached by a salesman.

Salesman (S): Hello, can I help you?
Customer (C): Hi. Yea, maybe. I've heard a lot of talk about the 320i Turbo and I'd like to know more about it, maybe take a test drive.

S: Well, I'm glad you stopped by. But first let me say that I take my job very seriously and I want to make sure that the 320i is the car for you. If I sell you a car and you're not happy with it, even if it works exactly as advertised, then we've got an unhappy customer and our reputation is damaged. You understand, don't you?
C: That makes sense.

S: Good. So let me ask you a quasi-philosophical question.
C (looking puzzled): Uhhhh...I really rather talk cars.

S: If you want a 320i you've gotta answer the quasi-philosophical question, it's company policy.
C: Alright.

S: What's a car for?
C (puzzled): What's a car for?

S: Right.
C (pauses): Cars are for taking people to places.

S: Very good. But people can go places without a car, can't they? For example they can walk, bike, or take a bus, right?
C: Sure.

S: So, what's a car for?
C: Is there anyone else I can talk to?

S: Sorry, no.
C (sighs): Ok. Well...cars are for taking people places they can't walk or bike to, and are not near the bus lines.

S: Very good. Cars take people places they can't easily get to any other way. Is that a fair restatement?
C: Yes.

S: Ok. Now for a more personal question. Are there places you want to go that you can't get to any other way than by car?
C: Well...

S: I ask you that because I noticed that you didn't drive up to the showroom, you walked.
C: That's right.

S: Do you currently own a car?
C: No, I don't.

S: Do you have a need to go places you can't walk to?
C: Well, no, not really. Where I live I can walk everywhere I need to go. My job, my friends', restaurants, libraries, the doctor, bars, Whole Foods, the Apple® store; I can get to these places and many more on my own.

S: Sounds like you're pretty well set; self-contained, as it were.
C: I suppose I am.

S: So why are you here?
C: I can't deny that this is a car-centric culture. People without a car are considered oddballs—or worse. Some of my walker friends would never set foot inside a dealership. Some even advocate making cars illegal, but every now and then I like to hear what you guys have to say. After all, I'm an open-minded and reasonable person. Can you prove to me that the Mastec 320i Turbo is my best transportation option?

S: If you don't believe that there are places you need a car to get to, I doubt any amount of performance data, reliability statistics, expert opinions, or even a test drive will convince you to buy. If you consider a concept irrational, the details are irrelevant.
C: But you shouldn't care whether I'd actually use the car. Aren't you supposed to get me to buy one even if I leave it in the garage.

S: No. That wouldn't do either of us any good.
C: So I guess you have to convince me first that there are interesting things happening in distance places that I missing out on.

S: Do you think I can do that?
C: Many car-owners have tried. But, of course they have to believe. If they don't they'll realize how much they've wasted.

S: So they are hopelessly biased.
C: Biased and, with all due respect, weak.

S: Weak?
C: Yes. They can't take the strain of life in the city. They dream of distant, idyllic meadows or white-sand beaches or other such delusions so they can deal with—or ignore—the dirt and violence outside their windows. Instead of accepting their situation, much less trying to improve things, they buy a car and read travel brochures all day long.

S: And that bothers you?
C: It wouldn't, but they think that being car owners makes them better than everyone else. They feel the need to tell everyone how great their car is, or how much better their "far-off country" is to the city. When they hear that I prefer to walk, they react with anger, or worse, pity. The oh-you-poor-thing look—I can't stand that!

S: I understand. But can you blame believers in distant, idyllic meadows and such for telling other people about them? Don't you share exciting news with your friends?
C: Exciting news, sure, but I keep my fantasies to myself. I have no desire to escape from the city. I like it here despite its problems. It's real, it's dangerous, it's unpredictable. It's fun! And anyway, idyllic meadows, if they did exist, would bore me to tears; everyone sitting around watching the grass grow doesn't sound idyllic to me. No, I'm sorry, I'm not interested in idyllic meadows. Regardless, the city is all there is; there are no "far-off places" of any sort.

S: Ok. I have another question for you.
C: Alright.

S: There are many components that go into a car and many other things without which it wouldn't run. Can you name some?
C: Well, there's gasoline, tires, various metal parts, is that what you mean?

S: Exactly. And where do car-owners get gasoline?
C: Gas stations, of course. They're on every street corner, you can't miss them with their big, obnoxious signs. But you know that it's not just car owners that use gas. I have a gas stove and a gas heating system. Almost everybody uses it.

S: True, I can't think of anybody that does not use some form of processed oil.
C: But car owner's think—

S: Wait, my question is not about what car-owners think. It's about gas, and tires, for example.
C: What about them?

S: Where do they come from?
C: Gas comes from gas stations, like I said, and tires can be bought there as well. Or you can get tires at a hundred other places. By the way, like with gas, tires are not just for cars.

S: Sure. Gas stations, however, only distribute gasoline to the public. They don't extract it or refine it. Even though there's a gas station on every corner have you ever seen a oil rig or a refinery in the city?
C: Out on the edge of the city there's vast industrial areas with huge tanks...

S: That's just another level of distribution. I'm talking about manufacture. Does gas come from the within the city? And although tires can be bought at hundreds of places have you ever seen a single rubber tree, much less the many millions it would take to produce all the rubber products sold and used in the city?
C: No, but it's a big city. I haven't been everywhere. The fact is we have gas and tires, so there must be oil rigs and rubber trees in the city somewhere.

S: Why's that?
C: Because, as I said, the city is all there is. Maybe I've never seen them but that's no reason to make up stories about distant lands with vast oil reserves or acres of rubber trees.

S: But that's a reasonable hypothesis, isn't it?
C: Only if you are naive enough to believe in distant lands in the first place. Even if I were that naive, I'd still have no reason to by a Mastec 320i Turbo, which is, if I recall, the reason I came in here.

S: It seems you have no need of any car.
C: Right.

S: (says nothing)
C: Well, it's been interesting; however, once again I leave a dealership without any desire to buy a car.

S: I'm sorry I couldn't be of more help. All I ask is that you think about our conversation. Keep your eyes open as you walk around the city. Don't dismiss ideas that don't fit your theory, but consider them with the same open-mindedness and reasonableness that you do for anything else. Maybe I'll see you back here again. Stop by anytime.
C: I'll do that, thanks. Bye.

S: Goodbye.